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FCC Studies of the Television Marketplace   
under George W. Bush: Flawed Measurements 
and Invalid Conclusions 
 
William M. Kunz 
 
Multiple Congressional acts require the Federal Communications Commission to 
review its ownership rules or measure the degree of competition in the television 
marketplace in various intervals.  The FCC under the Bush Administration did not 
adhere to the most basic element of those mandates and issued reports long after 
the required time period on numerous occasions.  There was a more substantive 
flaw in the FCC studies of the broadcast and cable marketplace from 2001 until 
2009 as the Commission relied on incomplete data and utilized inadequate defini-
tions in its analysis.  This essay evaluates FCC reports on ownership in prime time 
television and the video programming marketplace issued during the Bush Admin-
istration and critiques those measurements against ones built upon more accurate 
data and more appropriate definitions.   The conclusion reached is that the FCC 
consistently underreported on the level of concentration and conglomeration in the 




he proposed merger between NBC Universal and Comcast opened a new chapter 
in debates over media consolidation when it was announced on December 3, 
2009. The public battle between News Corp. and Time Warner Cable over re-
transmission consent for Fox owned and operated stations at the end of that same 
month raised further questions about the degree of conglomeration in the television market-
place. Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski stood on the 
sidelines through the opening salvos in those disputes, outside of a single statement on re-
transmission consent. There were no doubt various reasons for his reaction after less than 
six months back at the Commission, but there was also a clear challenge. During the Bush 
Administration, the FCC failed to meet its Congressional mandate to provide an accurate 
measurement of competition and diversity in the television marketplace, the analysis needed 
to understand the events of December 2009. 
There were times when the Commission‟s alleged manipulation of data during the Bush 
Administration earned rebukes in the courts or Congress. In 2003, Chairman Michael Pow-
ell announced wholesale relaxation of ownership rules then watched as Congress and the 
Court of Appeals rewrote or remanded those changes. In 2007, Chairman Kevin Martin cre-
ated a firestorm when he explored the enactment of a provision of the Cable Communication 
Act of 1984 that allowed for increased government regulation of cable television.1 A com-
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mittee staff report in the House of Representatives later claimed that Martin “manipulated, 
withheld, or suppressed data, reports, and information” and “created distrust, suspicion, and 
turmoil” among the Commissioners.2 The proposed revisions of Commission ownership 
rules in 2003 garnered the most attention, with particular focus on the public response and 
the Diversity Index used to argue for the changes. Others have focused on these issues in 
detail.3 There were, however, also substantive issues with the quality of the data collected 
and the validity of the conclusions reached in FCC studies of broadcast and cable television 
at the national level.  
In the summer of 2010, the FCC Media Bureau launched an examination of how the 
Commission “collects, uses and disseminates data” in an effort to “improve its fact-based, 
data-driven decision making.”4 These goals mirrored similar pronouncements made almost a 
decade earlier when Powell created a Media Ownership Working Group in 2001, stating that 
the Commission needed to rebuild the “factual foundation” for its ownership regulations and 
claiming the FCC had made policy decisions “without a contemporaneous picture of the 
media market.”5 That the Commission announced similar initiatives to address similar prob-
lems under both Democratic and Republican control would suggest a more fundamental is-
sue with how the FCC studies the marketplace and how it uses such research to support reg-
ulations and policies. That issue frames three basic questions that are the cornerstones of 
this analysis. First, how did the FCC use studies of the national television marketplace to 
promote market regulation under the Bush Administration; second, how did media conglom-
erates and lobbyists influence such studies and reports; and, third, how does the use of addi-
tional sources and/or criteria alter the picture of competition and diversity in the television 
marketplace.   
 
 
Theoretical & Legislative Framework 
The rapid expansion of broadcast and cable television is the common justification for chang-
es in FCC policies and regulations. Critics of regulation claim that the growth of cable and 
satellite services nullified the central tenet of the scarcity rationale, the legal argument that 
finite broadcast spectrum allows for some limitations of the First Amendment rights of li-
censees. Michael Powell was one of those detractors long before he became chairman of the 
FCC, arguing, “We must take the truth about scarcity of broadcast media out of the closet.”6 
The transformation of television in the United States since the mid-1970s is impossible to 
refute, but one must question whether the multiplicity of outlets has created true diversity. 
The issues raised in such debates connect with the cornerstones for the critical political 
economy of communication outlined in Dallas Smythe‟s seminal work:  “[W]ho gets what 
scarce resources and services, when, how and where?” and "[W]ho takes what actions in 
order to provide what scarce goods and services, when, how and where."7 That focus re-
mains at the core of this theoretical approach a half-century later, what Peter Golding and 
Graham Murdock describe as a concern with the “balance between capitalist enterprise and 
public intervention.”8 Golding and Murdock outline four “historical processes” central to the 
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critical political economy: “growth of the media; the extension of corporate reach; commod-
ification; and the changing role of state and government intervention.”9 How the FCC 
measures and in turn regulates the television marketplace, and the degree to which media 
conglomerates influence this process, resides squarely within this framework.10  
The focus on conglomerate influence on state action relates to another component that is 
of equal importance. Rather than a focus on political and economic theories in isolation, 
devoid of agency and action, critical political economy is concerned with the exercise of 
power and, in particular, media power and state power. Vincent Mosco defines political 
economy as the “study of the social relations, particularly power relations, that mutually 
constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources.” Within this frame-
work, power is understood as “both a resource to achieve goals and an instrument of control 
within social hierarchies.”11 For the purposes of this analysis, those resources are broadcast 
and cable television programs and services and the power to be examined is that of the me-
dia conglomerates within the FCC as well as broader arguments relative to the perceived 
benefits of “deregulation.”  
The rhetoric that such debates revolve around “deregulation” in and of itself reveals the 
imprint of power. Since the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan ascended to the presidency and 
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler co-authored “A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regula-
tion,” the idea of deregulation is the cornerstone around which all debates are framed.12 That 
was most evident in the mid-1990s, when the precursor to the Telecommunications Act 
moved through the Senate as an act to “accelerate” a “pro-competitive, de-regulatory nation-
al policy framework.”13 Within the political economic framework, it is not a matter of dereg-
ulation but rather a choice between different forms of regulation, each of which offers costs 
and benefits to different groups in society. Mosco argues that political economy “takes the 
entire social field, including the pattern of industry activity, as forms of regulation.”14 As 
such, the elimination of government regulation is “not deregulation but the expansion of 
market regulation.”15 This, in turn, connects to the process of commercialization and the re-
placement of state policies that promote the public interest with those that endorse market 
interests.  
There is another feature of critical political economy that holds significance for this 
study. Mosco outlines four central characteristics of this framework:  social change and his-
tory, social totality, moral philosophy and praxis. The first three connect with ideas ad-
dressed above, but the lattermost is also quite important since praxis focuses on knowledge 
as an “ongoing product of theory and practice.”16 In short, political economy is concerned 
with research that helps redress power imbalances and changes social structures. This also 
connects back to a central concern that Golding and Murdock address, that political econo-
my is concerned with “basic moral questions of justice, equity and the public good.”17 
 
 
Diversity in the Marketplace of Ideas  
Questions of ownership in media industries reach to core issues in modern societies. The 
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American model of the media evolved from the founding notions of a representative democ-
racy, within which the media, in theory, make self-government possible with the creation of 
a vibrant marketplace of ideas. This marketplace is a cornerstone of democratic governance 
and a common objective in Congressional legislation and FCC policies, which are often im-
plemented to maintain and/or increase diversity. Philip Napoli argues that the marketplace 
of ideas metaphor makes diversity one of the foundations of communications policy.18 It is 
also an important matrix in the evaluation of media systems, a focal point in critical policy 
studies. 
Definitions of diversity are crucial to this discussion. In its 2002 Biennial Regulatory 
Review, the Commission reaffirmed diversity as one of its core objectives and advanced a 
set of factors that promoted its continued existence, including outlet and source diversity.19 
In the view of the Commission, outlet diversity resulted from independently owned firms in 
a given market, while source diversity related to the availability of media content from vari-
ous producers. In the summer of 2003, in response to the vocal rebuttal to the biennial re-
view of media ownership, Powell claimed “the United States has the most diverse media 
marketplace in the world.”20 There is little question that there were more media outlets, but 
had such multiplicity resulted in diversity from independently owned firms and a wide range 
of producers? One can argue that it is possible to “increase the number of channels and the 
number of goods in circulation without significantly extending diversity.”21 
There are various types of diversity to consider in the analysis of different kinds of me-
dia. Denis McQuail outlines a framework built upon five stages in the process of communi-
cation for the design of diversity research: source diversity, channel diversity, diversity of 
content „as sent‟, diversity of content „as received‟ and receiver/audience diversity.22 Napoli 
refines this framework to focus on three dimension of diversity: source diversity, content 
diversity and exposure diversity.23 The inclusion of source diversity, including a focus on 
ownership diversity, provides a clear connection to this analysis. In particular, Napoli ad-
dresses the distinction often made between content ownership and outlet ownership and the 
challenges this presents with broadcast and cable television where conglomerates often 
“simultaneously qualify as both content and outlet owners.”24 
The discussion of exposure diversity is also quite important and connects to the measure-
ment of cable and satellite programming services that follows. Napoli argues that this is the 
“neglected diversity dimension” and makes the connection to the stage in the communica-
tion process of “content „as received‟” that McQuail outlined.25 The measurement of this 
dimension of diversity is more or less clear in the case of broadcast television, since the 
Nielsen ratings provide such data albeit with questions about accuracy and claims of bias. 
Cable and satellite services provide a far more difficult challenge, however, since Nielsen 
data is only available for prominent networks. The audience for Bloomberg Television, for 
example, could support a claim that news programming “as received” is more diverse than 
before, but Bloomberg did not subscribe to the Nielsen service in 2011 and chief executive 
officer Andy Lack said such measurements were somewhere “down the line.”26 
The limitations on Nielsen data point to the need for other means to address what Napoli 
argued is an important question: “what factors effect the levels of exposure diversity among 
Democratic Communiqué 25, No. 2, Fall 2012 4 FCC Studies of the Television Marketplace / Kunz 
4
Democratic Communiqué, Vol. 25 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol25/iss2/1
audiences.”27 In the case of cable and satellite programming, the rate of carriage of such ser-
vices on multichannel systems becomes critical and varies widely. The potential for expo-
sure among audiences is far greater for a service carried in 100 million households than one 
in less than 30 million, let alone those that count their subscribers in the tens of thousands. 
Napoli argues that the marketplace of ideas metaphor is not satisfied with the mere existence 




Congressional Mandates & FCC Studies of the Marketplace 
The Congressional mandates that require the FCC to measure the degree of competition and 
consolidation within the broadcast and cable television industries were written long before 
George W. Bush was sworn into office. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992 called on the FCC to report to Congress on an annual basis on the 
“status of competition in the market for the delivery of video programming.”29 The objec-
tives for this clause were clear in the introduction to Section 628 of the Act: to “promote the 
public interest, convenience and necessity by increasing competition and diversity in the 
multichannel video programming market.”30 Such a requirement was consistent with the 
mood on Capitol Hill at that time, as the Children‟s Television Act of 1990 passed in the 
previous Congress. Both acts were in reaction to the wholesale embrace of market regula-
tion under President Reagan.  
The origin of the second Congressional mandate is more difficult to explain but provides 
an important example of corporate influence on the legislative process. Section 202(h) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 called upon the FCC to review “all of its rules biennially 
as part of its regulatory reform review.”  That part of the act was consistent with the lan-
guage in earlier legislation, although the use of “regulatory reform” indicates the intent of 
the mandate. More significant, however, was what followed, since it called on the Commis-
sion to “determine whether any such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of 
competition” and stated that the Commission “shall repeal or modify any regulation it deter-
mines to be no longer in the public interest.”31 The final clause was akin to a poison pill, 
since it required the FCC to either eliminate or alter regulations or to make an argument that 
defended the continued existence of the rules. All of these decisions and justifications, 
moreover, could be challenged in the courts.  
That was exactly what the authors of that section of the Telecom Act had in mind. While 
Senator Larry Pressler took credit for pushing the act through Congress, it was a pair of lob-
byists for News Corp., Preston Padden and Peggy Binzel, who hatched section 202(h).32 The 
original focus of the 1996 Act was on telecom services, but it soon evolved into a broader 
rewrite of the Communications Act with broadcast and cable television on the docket. Two 
of the focal points in such discussions were the national television station ownership rule, 
which was raised from 25% to 35% of television households in the act, and the newspaper-
television cross ownership rule, combinations that had been barred since the 1970s. When 
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News Corp. and others could not convince Congress to include a wholesale repeal of those 
rules, Padden and Binzell advocated for the biennial review to insure that the ownership 
rules remained in play. The approach industry lobbyists embraced was clear: “You have to 
think long term. You have to convince a corporation that, when dealing with Congress, the 
front door may be locked, but there‟s always a window open somewhere.”33 
 
 
The New Television Marketplace  
On the night of February 28, 1983, the series finale of M*A*S*H was watched in 60.2% of 
television households nationwide. The total audience for the final episode was estimated at 
105.9 million viewers. Some two decades later, Friends ended a decade-long run on NBC. 
There were far more television households and far more potential viewers in 2004, but the 
audience for the final episode of Friends was less than half that of M*A*S*H, with 52.5 mil-
lion viewers in 29.8% of television households. Some might attribute the relative size of the 
audiences to the iconic stature of M*A*S*H, but most would point to a more fragmented 
television marketplace. The number of cable households more than doubled between 1983 
and 2004, from 29.4 million to 65.4 million, but most striking was the increase in the num-
ber and variety of programming services available in those households. 
There is no doubt that the emergence of cable and satellite television as content providers 
transformed the marketplace. But there is another fact that is undeniable. Since the mid-
1980s, changes in FCC policies and regulations have allowed for unprecedented consolida-
tion of broadcast networks, cable services and motion picture studios in a mere handful of 
conglomerates. The elimination of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules alone paved 
the way for three prominent mergers of television and motion picture assets: ABC and Dis-
ney in 1996, CBS and Paramount in 2000, and NBC and Universal in 2004. An important 
question that must be addressed is whether the approval of such mergers and acquisitions, as 
well as many other regulations and policies, were based on a strong “factual foundation” 
and a “contemporaneous picture of the media market” as Powell promised in the early days 
of the Bush Administration. 
 
 
FCC Analysis of Prime Time Programming 
Much of the debate surrounding the 2002 and 2006 ownership reviews conducted during the 
Bush Administration focused on issues related to horizontal reach, such as the newspaper-
television cross ownership and national television station ownership rules. Far less attention 
was paid to analysis related to vertical depth. There were no specific FCC rules related to 
prime time television under review, since the Commission allowed the Financial Interest 
and Syndication Rules (fin/syn) to expire in 1995, but both the 2002 and 2006 reviews in-
cluded analyses of prime time television that addressed questions about source diversity. In 
each case, the studies undertaken were used to support further market regulation, but there 
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are serious flaws with both the data utilized and the manner in which the studies were inte-
grated into broader policy decisions. 
 
Prime Time & 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review 
When the Commission eliminated the fin/syn rules in the 1990s, it argued that the broadcast 
networks were no longer in a position to leverage a financial interest in programs on their 
schedules. Under the Bush Administration, however, the FCC showed little interest in ascer-
taining whether such a conclusion was valid. There are various issues one could pose with 
how the Commission addressed the level of concentration in the prime time marketplace. In 
2003, Mara Einstein took an unusual step and wrote an editorial in Broadcasting & Cable 
over how the Commission used her analysis on the impact of the fin/syn rules on the diversi-
ty of program genres that was part of the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review. She begged that 
her research be used as intended, to “stimulate wider discussion on media ownership, media 
diversity and the underlying economics that guide media content.”34 
The inclusion of the Einstein analysis in the biennial review is problematic on numerous 
levels. The stated purpose of the study was to determine whether there was a “correlation 
between the FCC‟s imposition of financial interest and syndication rules and program diver-
sity on prime time broadcast network television” with a focus on content diversity.35 Ein-
stein concluded that program diversity increased as source diversity decreased following the 
expiration of the fin/syn rules, refuting claims that consolidation had “negative effects on 
diversity.”36 While the Commission reaffirmed program diversity as one of its core objec-
tives in the 2002 review, that was not the projected outcome of the fin/syn rules. The pur-
pose of the rules was to promote an “increase in the opportunity for the development of truly 
independent sources of prime time programming.”37 As such, while increased program di-
versity through fin/syn would be a benefit of the Commission rules, it was implemented to 
address source diversity and the conclusion was that the “market is seriously unbalanced to 
the disadvantage of producers and a freer, more diversified television production and distri-
bution process.”38 The Einstein analysis, moreover, showed a significant decrease in source 
diversity following the expiration of the rules in the 1990s. 
There is another dimension of the use of the fin/syn rules in the biennial review that is 
troublesome. While the Commission was anxious to use the perceived ineffectiveness of the 
fin/syn rules to support its argument for further market regulation, it refused to consider the 
degree to which the marketplace was once again unbalanced. As part of the review, the Coa-
lition for Program Diversity called upon the Commission to create a “25% Independent Pro-
ducer Rule” to ensure that prime time programs are “as diverse as possible” whereas the 
Writers Guild of America advocated a requirement that broadcast and cable networks pur-
chase 50% of the “entertainment” programming on their prime time schedules from inde-
pendent sources.39 Although the Commission invited comments on “behavioral rules to 
serve our public interest goals” as part of the biennial review, it concluded that the fin/syn 
proposals were “not squarely within the four concerns of our Notice” and that it “did not 
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intend, nor do we think the Notice can be fairly read to suggest, that a fin/syn overlay would 
or could substitute for structural regulation as a means of protecting our desiderata – local-
ism, competition, and diversity.”40 As such, while the majority on the Commission used the 
research related to the fin/syn rules to support its agenda, it argued that the rules themselves 
were outside the scope of the biennial review.  
 
 
Prime Time & 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review 
While one can cast doubt upon the appropriateness of the research questions that ground the 
FCC analysis of prime time television under the Bush Administration, there are also basic 
issues one can raise with the accuracy of the ownership data the FCC uses in its analysis of 
the marketplace.41 When the Commission allowed the remaining fin/syn rules to expire in 
1995, it argued that “no evidence has been presented that demonstrates that the established 
networks have exercised undue market power in acquiring a financial interest in prime time 
entertainment programming.”42 That conclusion was expected, but more significant was that 
the FCC eliminated mechanisms to determine whether networks wielded “undue market 
power” moving forward. When the FCC relaxed the rules in 1991, it instituted various re-
porting requirements related to network acquisition of program rights and participation in 
syndication.43 This included a certification that “rights in an outside production or a produc-
er-initiated in-house production were not obtained as a condition of network licensing or 
airing of the program.”44 
That confirmation was not the lone element of the reporting requirements that were elim-
inated. In 1995, multiple petitioners requested that the Commission maintain and even 
strengthen the reporting requirements, arguing that the FCC needed to monitor the conduct 
of the networks to assess the true impact of rule changes.45 One of the rules in place required 
networks to submit annual reports listing programs in which they held a financial interest or 
syndication rights. The Commission eliminated all such reporting requirements, arguing that 
the commentators had not demonstrated the need to continue such an obligation and agree-
ing with broadcast claims that it was an unreasonable burden. As a result, even the FCC 
does not have a complete record of the shows broadcast on the public airwaves in which the 
networks and their parent corporations hold a financial interest or syndication rights. 
The impact of this failure was evident in the 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review. The 
FCC commissioned Austan Goolsbee to examine the use of market power in the prime time 
program marketplace, but it could not provide the basic information needed to support valid 
measures and conclusions. Goolsbee utilized one of the best available resources, the Inter-
national Television and Video Almanac, but it lists the “suppliers” or “producers” of a given 
program, which focuses on the point of production and does not account for all companies 
that have a financial interest. Goolsbee concluded that “primetime broadcast television is a 
heavily vertically integrated endeavor and one can see that the life of an independent pro-
ducer of programming is likely to be rather difficult.”46 He concluded that around 18% of 
programs for the 2000-01 through 2004-05 seasons came from outside the conglomerates 
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that owned the broadcast networks. The question is whether such measures were accurate. 
The 2004-5 season illustrates the implications of Commission refusal to continue the 
most basic reporting requirements. The addition of other methods to ascertain an ownership 
interest in programs paints a much different picture. These methods include production list-
ings in prominent trade publications, including Variety and The Hollywood Reporter, end-of
-show credits including copyrights, and the U.S. Copyright Office database. The last steps 
are important ones. Most sources, for example, list Endemol USA as the program supplier 
for Extreme Makeover: Home Edition on ABC, but Greengrass Productions holds the copy-
right. This is significant, since Greengrass is a production unit within Disney.  
In the FCC analysis, Goolsbee concluded that CBS held a financial interest in 57.1% of 
the shows on its schedule in 2004-05.47 The Nielsen index published in The Hollywood Re-
porter also included 28 shows for CBS that season. When information in the International 
Television & Video Almanac is cross-referenced with listings in trade publication and end-of
-show credits, there is an ownership interest traceable to CBS or corporate parent Viacom in 
24 of 28 shows, 85.7%, with two of the non-aligned shows short-lived reality programs in-
serted between multiple runs of Survivor and The Amazing Race.48 Goolsbee concluded that 
broadcasters held a financial interest in an average of 81.5% of the programs on their net-
work or other networks between 2000-01 and 2004-05. The Hollywood Reporter included 
the Nielsen ratings for 156 series for the 2004-05 season. When additional methods are uti-
lized, there is an ownership interest traceable to the corporate parent of one of the networks 
in 143 of 156 shows, 91.7%.  
   
 
The Marketplace Revisited, Part I 
The central question in the FCC analyses of prime time programming is whether the broad-
cast networks utilize their position to extract a financial interest in programs on their sched-
ules and what this means in terms of source diversity. That was a concern when the FCC 
enacted the fin/syn rules in 1970 and it remained an issue long after it allowed the rules to 
expire. The problem is that the Commission did not mandate that a broadcast network pro-
vide basic information, such as the prime time programs in which it holds a financial inter-
est. The reporting requirements in place between 1991 and 1995 would allow for valid 
measurements of the prime time marketplace.  
These flaws undermine the debate over such issues. In 2006 and 2007, a consortium that 
included the Directors Guild of American and the Writers Guild of America called on the 
Commission to institute a rule that required the networks to allocate 25% of prime time pro-
gram time to “truly independent” sources. In that proposal, a source would be considered an 
“independent source” if it was not “directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or affiliated 
with ABC, CBS, FOX or NBC, or their subsidiaries or sister companies.”49 The Commission 
did not have a complete picture of independent production at that time, which made it im-
possible to consider such proposals. 
The measurement of the marketplace using the methods outlined above presents a more 
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accurate picture and reveals higher levels of concentration. For the last four season under 
the Bush Administration, 2004-05 through 2007-08, the six major media conglomerates – 
Disney, National Amusements (Viacom/CBS), NBC Universal, News Corp., Sony Corp. 
and Time Warner – held a financial interest in between 94.7% and 89.4% of the programs 
with attributable ownership, not counting movies, live sporting events and encore presenta-
tions. Sony Corp. is something of an interloper in this group since it does not own a broad-
cast network. Removing Sony from the group provides a snapshot of the share of “truly in-
dependent” sources defined above. In 2004-05 and 2005-06, all of the Sony programs were 
co-productions with CBS, so the share remains the same. When one removes the Sony pro-
grams that were co-productions with CBS in 2006-07 and 2007-08, the market share for the 
five conglomerates stands at 89.3% and 88.3%, respectively. The share of programs from 
independent sources on the debut schedules over four seasons, between 5.3% and 11.7%, is 
lower than that found in FCC studies and well below the 25% proposed in FCC filings. 
 
FCC Analysis of Cable and Satellite Programming Services  
The rise of cable television and perceived demise of broadcast television is an argument ad-
vanced often in analyses of the marketplace. In the midst of Congressional debate over the 
1992 Cable Act, Representative Jack Fields stated that without retransmission consent, 
“free, over-the-air TV could go the way of the dinosaur.”  Such connections between broad-
cast and cable have been around since the beginning. In 1958, the FCC ruled in Frontier 
Broadcasting v. Collier that the Commission had jurisdiction over cable to the degree that it 
is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsi-
bilities for the regulation of broadcast television.”50 The Commission formulated the first 
federal regulations in response to broadcast concerns over signal carriage, which included a 
requirement that all local broadcast stations be carried, and prohibited the importation of 
distant signals. 
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 embraced simi-
lar concerns. While rate regulation was one focal point of that act, the impact of cable on 
broadcast television was evident with the inclusion of must-carry and retransmission con-
sent provisions. Congress also mandated that the FCC report on the state of “competition in 
the market for the delivery of video programming” on an annual basis. The Commission 
under the Bush Administration failed to meet that obligation in the most basic sense, with 
over 20 months between the release of the eleventh report in 2005 and twelfth report in 2006 
and almost 27 months until the release of the thirteenth report in 2009. The thirteenth report, 
in fact, was released on January 16, just four days before Barack Obama was sworn into 
office. It is important to remember that this reporting requirement was part of Sec. 19, with 
a stated purpose being to “promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity by in-
creasing competition and diversity” in the marketplace. There is little doubt that the time 
since the passage of the 1992 Cable Act witnessed an increase in the number of services and 
genres, but it is far less certain that these changes resulted in content from diverse producers 
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The Role of the NCTA in FCC Reports 
The list of programming services the Commission included in the Eleventh Annual Report 
to Congress on the cable and satellite marketplace would suggest that there was indeed 
abundance. The report identified 388 national programming services in 2004, with 89 of 
those under the same corporate umbrella as a cable operator. Those numbers marked an in-
crease in the number of national programming services and a decrease in vertical integration 
between services and operators. When the report was released in February 2005, Chairman 
Powell argued that the video marketplace was the “most competitive and diverse” ever and 
proclaimed that the “monopolies of the past” had been neutralized. No sooner had the report 
been released than questions arose about the validity of such conclusions.  
Commissioners Michael Copps and Jonathan Adelstein were among those raising con-
cerns, arguing that the Commission had gathered “less than adequate data” and conducted 
insufficient analysis.51 The fundamental flaw in the Commission approach was evident in 
the second paragraph of the report:  “We do not require data submissions nor do we audit 
data provided.”52 As noted above, the report stated that the commission “identified 388 sat-
ellite-delivered national programming networks” in 2004, but the tables that listed those net-
works cited less than 25 sources. The most significant in this group was a publication of the 
National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA), Cable Developments 2004. 
The bulk of the services contained in the FCC report were taken from the “Directory of Ca-
ble Networks” in the NCTA publication. The NCTA is the leading advocate for the cable 
industry in Washington, so it has a vested interest in such debates. There is no question, 
moreover, that the interests of the NCTA are best served through the image of a robust mar-
ketplace, whether such appraisals are accurate or not.  
The annual assessment of the video marketplace serves as a factual foundation for the 
Commission as well as Congress. An examination of the report, however, poses serious 
questions about the reliability of the analysis and validity of the conclusions. Some of the 
flaws are basic errors. The Eleventh Annual Report, for example, included a number of 
channels that were counted multiple time as well as various channels that went dark prior to 
the start of 2004 or did not launch before the end of the year. Most problematic were pro-
gramming services that died long before 2004 but remained in the analysis. This included 
My Pet TV which began distributing one hour of programming a day in 1997 but closed in 
1998. While the network went dark, it appeared on the FCC list of national video program-
ming services six years later and remained in the NCTA database in 2009. 
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What is a Network? 
The inclusion of programming services long since defunct or still on the drawing board 
points to a much larger issue in the annual reports. When the FCC enacted the fin/syn rules 
in 1970, the Commission established clear definitions of what constituted a network: 
“fifteen or more hours per week to at least twenty-five affiliated television licensees in ten 
or more states.”53 This provision of the rules allowed News Corp. to launch the Fox network 
in 1986 with Twentieth Century Fox Television programming since it did not qualify as a 
“network” under the FCC definition. While News Corp. skirted the rules, a network defini-
tion that integrated both time (hours) and reach (affiliates and states) made applying the fin/
syn rules viable. The failure of the Commission to utilize a definition of national program-
ming services in its annual reports on video programming, on the other hand, rendered the 
measures of the marketplace almost meaningless.  
In the Twelfth Annual Report, issued in 2006, the Commission celebrated a dramatic 
increase in the number of satellite-delivered national programming networks, from 388 in 
2004 to 531 in 2005, an increase of 143 networks. Eclipsing the mythical 500-channel barri-
er might have seemed significant, but there was precious little analysis of what the numbers 
represented and where the expansion came from. The Commission did address some of the 
problems evident in the Eleventh Annual Report outlined above and there was additional 
discussion of related issues such as must carry and retransmission consent, but the report fell 
well short of the kind of analysis that Commissioners Copps and Adelstein called for after 
the previous report. 
Flaws with the FCC analysis become evident in the examination of foreign language ser-
vices. As noted earlier, the NCTA was the main source of data in the report issued in 2005 
and it did not account for most foreign language services available via direct-broadcast-
satellite. The FCC utilized more resources in its subsequent report, but this did little more 
than muddy the waters. Of the networks listed in the Twelfth Annual Report, more than one-
third of them, over 200, transmitted in languages other than English. That total also repre-
sented a four-fold increase from the previous report. As such, while there was an increase of 
143 national programming services between the two reports, the addition of 153 non-
English services meant the number of English language services decreased between 2004 
and 2005. 
Some of these services were Spanish language feeds of well-known English-language 
services such as HBO Latino, ESPN Deportes and CNN en Espanol. A few were long estab-
lished Spanish language cable services such a Galavision, which began 2009 in over 50 mil-
lion households. And several were foreign language services that were part of the Comcast-
owned International Networks that were also available via direct-broadcast-satellite. The 
majority of these services, however, were in-language programming from international 
sources carried on no more than one affiliate, Dish Network or DirecTV, with minuscule 
household penetration. This is a serious flaw. The 2005 FCC report, for example, included 
four Urdu-language services that were available via Dish Network. While it is difficult to 
find subscriber figures for these services, the 2000 census estimated that the U.S. had a total 
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population of 262,900 who spoke Urdu at home. In the FCC measurement of the market-
place, the four Urdu language services equaled four Disney owned networks – ESPN, 
ESPN2, ESPN Classic and ESPNews – that were in over 60 million households each at the 
start of 2009. 
The failure to include total households and the number of affiliates in the measure of na-
tional programming services were among numerous flaws with the FCC methodology. Vari-
ous Spanish-language and religious services distributed their programming via local broad-
cast stations, which made them more akin to ABC, CBS and NBC than to traditional cable 
services. Trinity Broadcasting Network, for example, ranked as the eighth largest station 
group in 2008 with 25 full-power stations that reached over 35 percent of television house-
holds nationwide.54 TBN also owned over 200 low-power television stations that gain local 
cable coverage through must-carry provisions. What was also interesting about TBN is that 
it used digital multi-casting to broadcast the Church Channel as well as JCTV, Smile for a 
Child, and TBN Enlace, which programmed for youth, children and Spanish-language 
speakers, respectively. While satellite systems, including religious services such as Glo-
rystar, and Internet Protocol Television services such as Sky Angel IPV, transmitted some 
or all of the TBN networks, the failure to differentiate such networks was another flaw in 
the FCC approach. 
Other significant questions with the FCC studies is that there are no distinctions made 
between services that transmit a few hours a week and those that are on 24 hours a day, sev-
en days a week and between services that have dedicated channels on cable and satellite sys-
tems and those that are carried on other networks or video-on-demand. The Twelfth Annual 
Report included Deep Dish TV, a non-profit organization that supports movements for so-
cial change and economic justice, in its list of programming services. There is little question 
that Deep Dish TV brought diversity to the marketplace, but its programming was carried on 
public access channels on local cable systems and on Free Speech TV or Link TV on Di-
recTV and Dish Network. Deep Dish TV launched in 1986 and distributed over 300 hours 
of programming in its first 22 years, about what CNN and Fox News Channel distribute eve-
ry two weeks. 
 
The Marketplace Revisited, Part II 
In its Thirteenth Annual Report, which the Commission adopted in November 2007 but did 
not release until January 2009, the FCC counted 565 satellite-delivered national program-
ming networks in 2006. The first concern of the Commission was on vertical connections 
and it concluded that 84 networks (14.9%) were integrated with at least one cable operator, 
a decrease since the previous report.55  It then shifted the lens to national programming net-
works affiliated with other media entities, including broadcast networks and stations, and 
found an additional 124 networks (21.9%) with such connections.56 The Commission con-
cluded that more than half of the national programming networks, 274 of 531 (51.6%), had 
no connections to cable operators or other media entities. Without further investigation, this 
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might suggest that the major media conglomerates are not dominant in the cable and satellite 
marketplace. That, however, would be a flawed conclusion since these measures do nothing 
to assess exposure diversity. 
The issues discussed earlier inflate the total number of national programming networks 
included in the FCC report, but there is another problem with the methods used. At the start 
of 2009, for example, MTV had carriage in 97 million households compared to just 250,000 
for BET Hip-Hop. In the Thirteenth Annual Report, however, these Viacom-owned services 
were no different in the eyes of the Commission, in spite of far more exposure for MTV. 
One could argue that MTV earned carriage in almost every cable and satellite household 
because it appeals to television viewers and there would be some truth to that claim. Such a 
conclusion, however, would ignore MTV ownership links to cable operators from 1981 until 
1995 and corporate links to CBS station group starting in 2000. These connections provided 
MTV with leverage in its quest for carriage. 
The number of cable and satellite households is a critical factor for programming ser-
vices and an important measure of exposure diversity. Since most national and regional pro-
gramming services receive carriage fees on a per home basis, even small increases can af-
fect the financial health of a network. The 30 million household threshold, moreover, was 
long viewed as the minimum needed for the sale of national advertising, although Turner 
Broadcasting shuttered CNN/fn because it concluded that number was not enough to make it 
viable. These factors point to the need to examine cable and satellite services that eclipse 30 
million and 60 million households.  
The focus on national programming services that reach these critical levels paints a far 
different picture of outlet and source diversity as well as exposure diversity in the market-
place. Based on figures in corporate documents, NCTA and Cable Advertising Bureau pub-
lications and trade journals, there were a total of 59 cable and satellite services with carriage 
in more than 60 million households at the start of 2008, not counting C-SPAN and C-Span 
2. The six conglomerates with ownership of a major motion picture studio and/or main-
stream broadcast network had an ownership interest in 72.9% of those networks. Since Sony 
Corp. had a financial interest in just one network, GSN: Game Show Network, through a 
joint venture with Liberty Media, five conglomerates had an ownership interest in 71.2% of 
those services. What is significant about these numbers is that just one of those conglomer-
ates, Time Warner, was also a cable operator at the time, so vertical integration was not a 
major factor. 
The addition of Liberty Media and Comcast to this group is also revealing. Most of the 
services within Liberty Media built their subscriber base while connected to Tele-
Communications, Inc., the largest cable MSO of the 1990s. The services within Comcast, on 
the other hand, expanded within the largest cable operator of the 2000s after it merged with 
a successor to Tele-Communications, Inc. When Liberty Media and Comcast are included in 
these totals and Sony is removed, valid given the fact that Liberty Media owns the other 
50% of GSN, seven corporations have a financial interest in 88.1% of the cable and satellite 
programming services in over 60 million households at the start of 2008. 
The 30-60 million grouping is harder to determine. While accurate figures were available 
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in corporate documents and trade publications for most of the services that eclipse 60 mil-
lion households, the lower threshold introduces a broader range of ownership. With Di-
recTV and Dish Network reaching 30.6 million households at the start of 2008, moreover, it 
was appropriate to include broadcast outlets such as Trinity Broadcasting Network that are 
carried on basic tiers of both services. An estimated 44 networks reached between 30 and 60 
million cable and satellite households without the use of local broadcast stations and the five 
major media conglomerates had a financial interest in 15 of those. The inclusion of Liberty 
Media and Comcast increased that total to 25 of 44 (56.8%). The premium movie channels 
also present challenges, since the six most prominent brands – HBO, Showtime, Cinemax, 
The Movie Channel, Encore and Starz! – offer multiple channels on most cable and satellite 
systems. For the purposes of this analysis, each of these groups are counted once, with Na-
tional Amusements, Time Warner and Liberty Media controlling two each.  
The dominance of the five conglomerates with ownership of both broadcast networks 
and motion picture studios and the two corporations with historic links to Tele-
Communications Inc. is clear in this analysis. Those seven corporations had an ownership 
interest in 88.1% of the networks in over 60 million cable and satellite households and 
56.8% of the networks in between 30 and 60 million households at the start of 2008. With 
the addition of the six premium services, the seven conglomerates have an ownership inter-
est in 76.1% of the services measured. The success of the broadcast groups in surpassing 60 
million households, moreover, would suggest that stations are valuable properties in car-
riage negotiations.  
 
Conclusion 
The connections between broadcast and cable interests in the age of media conglomerates 
are undeniable. In 2000, when Disney and Time Warner waged war over retransmission 
consent for a collection of ABC owned and operated stations, Disney sought increased car-
riage for six networks:  Disney Channel, Toon Disney, SoapNet, ESPN2, ESPN Classic and 
ESPNews. The success of that campaign was evident at the start of 2008, when ESPN2 and 
Disney Channel were carried in over 90 million households and the other four were carried 
in over 60 million households each. The license that ABC held to operate local broadcast 
stations might have stated that it was to serve the public interest, convenience and necessity, 
but in this case it was Disney interests that came first. 
The battle between Disney and Time Warner Cable also points to the need for more so-
phisticated measurements of television production and distribution. It is apparent from this 
analysis that the FCC under Republican leadership was unwilling or unable to produce such 
studies. There are also broader issues with the FCC and how it measures the marketplace, 
ones that touch on the close relationship between the Commission and the industries it regu-
lates. The failure of the Commission to write rules under the Clinton Administration that 
required broadcast licensees to report ownership interest in prime time programming under-
mined its own analysis of the marketplace. The rationale that it was a burden to the broad-
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cast networks to provide such information points to the influence of the conglomerates with-
in the FCC. The Commission‟s reluctance to utilize basic definitions and classifications un-
der both Republican and Democratic control, moreover, rendered the analysis of cable and 
satellite programming services all but meaningless. The failure to provide an accurate meas-
urement in these areas undermined Congress and the Commission in their roles as guardians 
of the communications infrastructure. 
A more sophisticated measurement of the prime time marketplace raises serious concerns 
about source diversity. The Commission sponsored analysis of the prime time marketplace 
concluded that the life of an independent program producer would be “difficult” during this 
period. The introduction of additional information, however, makes the situation even more 
perilous. For the last four seasons under the Bush Administration, 2004-05 through 2007-08, 
the five media conglomerates with ownership interests in both motion picture studios and 
broadcast networks held a financial interest in over 88% of the prime time programs the 
schedules of ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX and CW. These percentages point to appalling levels of 
source diversity, but they also underscore the flaws in the FCC analysis of prime time televi-
sion. 
The inclusion of exposure diversity into these discussions with a focus on cable and sat-
ellite programming services raises additional concerns with FCC studies. While Nielsen rat-
ings provide a snapshot of diversity „as received‟ among the most prominent cable and satel-
lite services, many such networks are not included in these measurements and that raises 
serious questions. Additional methods are needed to paint an accurate picture of the market-
place. Carriage of cable and satellite services is also often negotiated in bundles, linked to 
retransmission consent of broadcast stations with conglomerates such as Disney, so the level 
of household penetration often connects back to questions about market power and leverage. 
The revised measurement of cable and satellite services reveals far less diversity when addi-
tional criteria are introduced into the analysis, with close to 90% of the services in over 60 
million households at the start of 2008 under the umbrella of seven media conglomerates. 
When the Commission launched its 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, it set forth five 
factors that promoted diversity, two of which are critical to this study. As discussed earlier, 
the Commission defined source diversity as the availability of media content from a variety 
of content producers, while it defined outlet diversity as the existence of multiple inde-
pendently owned firms in a given market. It is undeniable that there is a dramatic increase in 
the number of prime time program hours and the number of programming services, but mul-
tiplicity does not equal diversity. In this analysis of prime time programming, there was lim-
ited source diversity in the television marketplace. In these domains, independent produc-
tions and non-aligned services were all but extinct. In the analysis of cable and satellite tele-
vision, there were independent and non-aligned networks, but their household penetration 
levels were often miniscule when compared to prominent services. Once again, the major 
conglomerates were dominant in these discussions, raising serious concerns about source 
diversity. The FCC should be concerned with the degree of consolidation and level of con-
centration in the television marketplace, but the Republican majority under President Bush 
showed little apprehension as it pushed forward its agenda under chairmen Powell and   
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